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Human Security 15 Years after Lysøen: 
The Case against Drone Killings
Astri Suhrke
The concept of human security has evolved in two directions: (1) a comprehensive 
vision of security and development, and (2) a concretization of the concept tied to 
protection of civilians in armed conflict. This article discusses the two approaches 
and their relative merits. Starting with the Lysøen Declaration of 1998 and Canada’s 
subsequent introduction of the concept of human security in the Security Council, 
the article argues that a concretization is necessary today. One way to do this is to 
link human security to campaigns for protection of civilians against the U.S. use 
of drones in targeted killings outside recognized war zones. This strategy would 
revitalize human security as a relevant policy concept, and also create greater 
security for people living in exposed communities.
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Introduction
Since it was launched in the early 1990s, the concept of human security has 
evolved in two distinct directions. In one direction, the concept has retained its 
original general nature, but the notion of “freedom from threat” in a security 
sense has been added to “freedom from want” in the development sense that was 
at the core of the original idea presented by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in 1994. The report by the Commission on Human Security 
in 2003, a decade after the UNDP report, marked the revitalizing of the concept 
in its general and broad form. The other road traveled has been quite different. 
Here human security has served as an umbrella, but the political energies of its 
supporters have been directed towards concretizing and defining some of the 
elements sheltering under it in ways that could produce policy action and change 
in practice. The Canadian initiatives in the late 1990s that placed “protection of 
civilians” as an item under human security on the Security Council agenda is a 
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case in point.
This article discusses the two approaches to human security and their relative 
merits, arguing that concretization is necessary to bring a sharper vision forward. 
One way to concretize and revitalize the concept at the present historical juncture, 
it is further argued, is to link it to current campaigns for protection of civilians, 
such as the campaign opposing the U.S. use of drones for targeted killings outside 
recognized war zones. This strategy would not only help keep the concept alive, 
but also create greater security for people living in exposed communities.
In line with this argument, this article has two thematic parts. The first 
discusses the origins of the concept of human security and, in some detail, 
its first significant concretization in the United Nations. This concretization 
focused on protection of civilians, as introduced by Canada in the Security 
Council. The second thematic section examines the subsequent evolution of 
the concept. The dominant trend has been to stress the comprehensive and 
general nature of human security, as exemplified by the Commission on Human 
Security (UN 2003). In contrast to this focus, the article suggests the alternative 
of concretization, developed with reference to security against illegal killing. 
The analysis here discusses drone killings as a distinctly contemporary threat to 
human security, which, as practiced by the United States, violates the rights of 
individuals to protection against extra-judicial execution. 
The Origins
Human security originated as a broad development concept, elaborated in the 
UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1994, only four years after the first report 
was launched. The series was the brainchild of Mabub al Haq, who was also the 
principal author of the 1994 report (UNDP 1994). The 1994 report was one of 
the more important and positive outcomes of the competitive dialogue between 
the World Bank and the UNDP, as reflected in the way human security was 
defined: In response to the Bank’s emphasis on economic growth as the goal of 
development, Mabub al Haq dialectically positioned individual welfare as the key 
objective and offered human security as its conceptual derivative. The definition 
was broad, the parameters defined only as freedom from want/fear and freedom 
to basic entitlements (ibid., 22-23).
Four years later, at the end of 1998, human security was inserted into the 
discourse of the UN Security Council. This may not seem so strange today, but at 
the time it was a radical development. The new element in the discourse meant 
that the Security Council could focus on the security of individuals rather than of 
nations as in its traditional mandate. The change set up a potential confrontation 
with the principle of national sovereignty—arguably the most hallowed principle 
in the UN system. Moreover, it elevated humanitarian matters to the sphere of 
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high politics.
How and why did this happen? The simple answer is—the Canadians. The 
Canadian government was at the time campaigning for one of the rotating seats 
on the UN Security Council, and it needed an agenda. Securing a seat on the 
Security Council, as we know, is a major and intensely competitive enterprise. 
Canada campaigned on a platform of three themes; the first of these was to 
integrate human security into the agenda of the Council.1 Canada won the seat, 
and for two calendar years (1999-2000) was successful in placing human security 
on the Council’s agenda. It is a testimony to the importance of that initiative 
that subsequently human security was routinely and regularly discussed in the 
Council. 
In retrospect, it is clear that human security was a perfect theme for the 
Canadian campaign for several reasons. First, it elevated a discourse that was 
already becoming prominent in international aid and humanitarian communities. 
The term itself invested humanitarian issues with the significance attached to 
the word “security,” and inserting it into the Security Council agenda meant 
humanitarian questions would henceforth be on the single most important table 
in the UN system. We now take it for granted that the Security Council regularly 
discuss issues such as protection of civilians in armed conflict, humanitarian 
access, accountability under international humanitarian law, and so on. This 
was not the case until the Canadians used human security to pry open the door. 
Second, human security resonated with Canadian national politics and a recently 
established dimension of Canada’s international image. What better way to 
launch your candidacy than under the banner of “security with a human face,” 
a concept befitting a nation where humanitarianism and peacekeeping had long 
been important foreign policy objectives. Finally, human security would become 
another element in bilateral cooperation between Canada and Norway to enhance 
their profiles internationally in matters of peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs. 
This cooperation dates back to the so-called Oslo-Ottawa axis formed by Halvard 
Lange and Lester Pearson in the late 1950s and extending into the early 1960s.
The Norwegian government was a supportive player of Canada’s early 
campaign for human security, as evidenced by its hosting the meeting that led 
to the Lysøen Declaration in May 1998. Lysøen was one of the early platforms 
for Canada’s Security Council bid, and Norway’s hosting role reflected similar 
aspirations. Angling for a seat on the Security Council for the term following 
Canada’s (2001-2002), the Norwegian government was preparing the ground 
and cultivating friends. The Norwegian campaign focused on strengthening 
the Council’s role in conflict management generally,2 but human security was 
certainly compatible with this line as well as attractive in itself (Fermann 2000). 
Norway, like Canada, had a foreign policy profile that stressed humanitarianism, 
peacemaking, and loyalty to the United Nations. A new coalition government 
had come to power in 1997 led by the Christian Democratic Party, which had a 
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particularly strong commitment to aid and humanitarian issues. After Canada 
was elected to the Security Council, the Canadian delegation expressed its 
appreciation for the supportive work done by Norway, and there was some 
expectation that if Norway won a seat in 2001 (which it did), it would carry the 
torch after Canada.
The above presentation, admittedly, owes much to a neo-realist theoretical 
approach to understanding international relations. I developed this interpretation 
further in an article published in 1999, entitled “Human Security and the Interests 
of States” (Suhrke 1999), but I recognize now more clearly that the sharp realist 
edge calls for some modification. 
Neo-realist interpretations emphasize that states are driven by interests 
rather than by ideals, and that power is central in defining interests (including the 
power that comes with a rotating seat on the Security Council). This perspective 
needs to be balanced by an appreciation of why states define their interests in 
particular terms. Why human security and not other concepts? The context 
gives part of the answer. Generally, the 1990s were known as “the humanitarian 
decade,” suggesting an international order with humanitarianism embedded in 
the language and values of international politics. As noted above, these values 
harmonized with traditional foreign policy values in both Canada and Norway. 
In Canada, a liberal government (with both small and large “L”) had come to 
power with a progressive policy agenda, and a forceful foreign minister, Lloyd 
Axworthy, had taken charge of foreign policy. As one participant in the new 
government wrote, it was an “extraordinarily fruitful time in Canadian foreign 
policy.”3 In other words, the concept of human security was launched with a 
genuine commitment and distinct idealism; it was much more than a campaign 
slogan to get Canada onto the Security Council (McRae and Hubert 2001).
Yet it remains striking that noble ideas apparently need to be propelled 
forward by more robust interests of power and ambition (such as getting a seat 
on the Council). In 1999, that combination got human security on the Security 
Council agenda, enriched—and indeed shifted—the political discourse and 
expanded the inventory of humanitarian practices. Subsequently, however, the 
concept lost much of its punch. An intergovernmental network was established, 
but, except for Japan, no country really promoted human security as a central 
foreign policy objective. In Canada, a later government closed down the human 
security website. As of 2013, the term was not a subject heading among the eight 
main categories listed on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a 
quick search revealed only 105 citations of the term (with the most recent in 
2004). In Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs similarly does not list human 
security as a subject heading on its (English language) website, and a search 
yielded only 37 references in the period 2004–2012. By contrast, a similar 
review of the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced 2,022 
references in the English version, and 6,085 times in Japanese (International 
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Studies Quarterly 2012).
How do we explain the demise of a normative concept that once appeared so 
powerful? We have to consider both the context and the concept.
Context and Concept
Has the global political context changed to make humanitarian language less 
attractive and relevant? The global context certainly changed after 2001. The 
United States announced a “global war on terror” (that is still continuing) and, 
with support of its major allies, invaded two states: first Afghanistan (in 2001) 
and then Iraq (in 2003). These wars and the related violence perpetrated by the 
adversaries dominated much of the policy discourse of the first decade of this 
century. At the UN, the discourse now spoke of insecurity and new threats—
threats from terrorism on a global scale, from drug smuggling and human 
trafficking, from piracy and epidemics. These and other threat scenarios were 
laid out by a high-level report requested by the Secretary-General in mid-decade 
(UN 2004). But parallel, and partly in response, was a new surge in humanitarian 
activism promoted by prominent activists (also called humanitarian hawks by 
their critics). This type of activism was evident in many forms and fora. One 
strand focused on military interventions for ideal ends, but there was also support 
for difficult humanitarian operations (e.g., in the Darfur), as well as for important 
institutional developments. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established 
in 2002, was one such institutional innovation; concepts and principles regarding 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) also received a measure of endorsement by 
the UN World Summit in 2005; and the UN formally recognized the importance 
of peacebuilding by establishing the Peacebuilding Commission in the same year.
What happened to human security in this surge of activism to promote 
human rights and humanitarian concerns? It did not become a conceptual 
umbrella or flagship for any strand of the new activism. Instead it was 
appropriated by the broader development community, as well by smaller 
communities with specialized agendas. 
To understand why this happened we need to go back to 1999 and Canada’s 
role in the Security Council. Human security was initially presented as a policy 
vision—a general sense that the individual rather than the nation should be 
at the heart of that which is to be secured, as Lloyd Axworthy said at a second 
Lysøen meeting in 1999 (DFAT 1999). But a policy vision requires conceptual 
clarification if it is to be taken seriously as an objective of foreign policy. Political 
leaders who are asked to line up behind a positive slogan will want to know what 
it entails. A concerned public will wonder if it is more than a slogan. Analysts 
inside and outside government need to assess whose interests are being served, 
and what the likely consequences will be—whether intended or not.  
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The Canadians worked hard to give human security such a focus and clarity 
after taking its seat on the UN Security Council in January 1999. At that time, it 
was still unclear exactly what human security meant, and ideas were bouncing 
around. I was present at a meeting in Ottawa, in February 1999, where some 
academics (including myself) and government officials from Norway and Canada 
met for what was effectively a brainstorming session to flesh out the meaning of 
human security. I am not sure the meeting produced great results, but a specific 
agenda soon emerged from the team around Lloyd Axworthy. The agenda had 
three main components: support for R2P, the ICC, and protection of civilians. 
Canada initially developed R2P outside the UN through a commission, and, as 
noted above, the concept received the UN imprimatur in 2005. As for the ICC, 
the task in 1999 was to get a sufficient number of ratifications to ensure that 
the Rome Treaty went into effect. That number was reached in 2001. The third 
element of human security—protection of civilians—was pursued at the Security 
Council. Let us look more closely at this item.
The first concrete issue under the human security umbrella that Canada 
placed on the Security Council agenda was protection of civilians during armed 
conflict. Canada initiated the first open discussion in the Council on this subject 
as early as February 1999, and by way of follow-up requested a report from 
the Secretariat. The Secretary-General’s report on protection of civilians duly 
appeared in September that year  (UN 1999). It was a comprehensive assessment 
of the problems (“challenges” in UN language), the responses in terms of law and 
practice, and recommendations (40 in all). It was the very first thematic report 
of this kind by the UN. Previous Secretary-General reports to the Council on 
related themes had focused on countries or missions (although there had been 
one humanitarian thematic report on refugees, not surprising given that this was 
a UN mandate subject).  But from 1999 onwards things changed. The once novel 
practice of open discussions in the Security Council on protection of civilians was 
institutionalized. A biannual report from the Secretary-General on protection of 
civilians became the occasion for a regular, open Security Council discussion of 
the subject. In addition, debates addressed particular subthemes, such as children 
and women in armed conflict. Security Council resolutions came to focus on 
various aspects of protection of civilians. By 2013, the initiatives had multiplied 
and specialized websites monitored the process.4
In retrospect, it is clear that the two initiatives in 1999—the first Security 
Council discussion and the Secretary-General’s report—were pathbreaking, 
although it should be noted that Canada kept up the pressure the following 
year with similar requests for an open discussion, a resolution, and a report 
from the Secretary-General. In this way continuity was assured and momentum 
maintained. The term “human security” did not appear in the first Council 
debate or in the Secretary-General’s report, and infrequently in later ones. Rather, 
the Canadian strategy was evidently to use human security as a legitimizing 
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platform from which particular humanitarian initiatives could be launched. To 
gain traction, these initiatives needed to be concretized and properly wired, so 
to speak. Protection of civilians was one such initiative which enabled the UN 
and other concerned actors to address a set of distinct humanitarian problems in 
political, legal, and practical terms. 
Other initiatives were launched from the human security platform. In 
addition to R2P, the sub-cluster on protection of women and children in armed 
conflict owes something to the concept of human security; so to some extent 
does the whole peacebuilding sector. In the world of academe and think tanks, it 
is telling that a research institute which has incorporated “human security” in its 
name and whose annual Human Security Report is widely referenced, has likewise 
sharpened and concretized its work by focusing on one core element: organized 
violence. The report (published in Canada) tracks global and regional trends in 
organized violence, their causes and consequences.5
By contrast, where human security was promoted as a comprehensive 
framework—when the platform itself with multiple items became the policy—
it had little apparent impact. The best example of this is the Commission on 
Human Security, whose report was published in 2003. The Commission was 
composed of eminent international personalities and produced a solid report. But 
the scope was so broad as to be unfocused. The report returned to the strategy 
of its UNDP predecessor, the 1994 Human Development Report, by adopting a 
broad development focus—freedom from want and freedom from threats, in part 
linked to the UN-defined Millennium Development Goals: 
Human security is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s vital 
freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering 
people to take charge of their own lives. Needed are integrated policies that focus on 
people’s survival, livelihood and dignity, during downturns as well as in prosperity (UN 
2003, iv).  
As a general vision, focusing on “people’s survival, livelihood and dignity” was 
laudable, but the novelty of the vision had faded, and, as a policy initiative, it 
was too broad to be very useful. The Report was barely cited and has left few 
traces. It is indicative that a search of the website of the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs for the term “human security” for the period 2004–2012 
showed no reference at all to the Commission’s report. By contrast, there were 
three references to the annual report from the Canadian think tank on human 
security that publishes annual data on organized violence. As with the protection 
of civilians and other initiatives launched earlier from the Canadian platform, 
organized violence was a sufficiently concretized and actionable focus to catch 
the attention of policy makers.
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The Present Juncture
If a sharpening of focus is required to translate vision into action, we should ask: 
What are the most relevant forms in which human security manifests itself at 
present?
One place to start is a focused survey of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs website for the years 2004–2012 conducted by the author. In this period, 
“human security” was referenced 37 times, mostly in speeches by the minister 
(32 times); the rest were in press releases, official reports, and similar documents. 
The frequency is remarkably low. About four citations a year is not a lot, 
particularly considering all the speeches a foreign minister makes. Moreover, 
human security was most frequently used as a general term (10 times), without 
further specification of meaning. The second most frequent use of the term was 
in relation to arms control or nuclear weapons (8 citations); several of these 
marked the 10th anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty. The other categories of 
concretization, which all occurred with even less frequency, were global health, 
environment (climate change), gender equality, and transnational crime (human 
trafficking). Human security as protection of civilians was mentioned only two 
times in these nine years, and human security as R2P only once.
The low frequency notwithstanding, the various concretized derivatives of 
the broader human security vision are promising. It shows that the concept still 
has the vitality to inspire, legitimize and empower, while concretization provides 
the focus and relevance necessary for policy and practice. Not on the list—at least 
at the time of the survey—was a problem that has received increased attention in 
2013-2014, namely state-executed targeted killings outside recognized zones of 
armed conflict by means of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones. Placing 
protection against such violence under the human security umbrella would build 
on the dimension that was successfully introduced in the Security Council in the 
late 1990s: physical security and protection of civilians in armed conflict. It would 
further add the equally important element: rule of law. Both dimensions frame 
the controversial practice by the United States of using drones for what many 
legal analysts consider to be extra-judicial executions abroad.
Sophisticated drone technology has dramatized the profoundly problematic 
nature of targeted killings outside clearly recognized war zones. Such killings are 
certainly not new (most infamously, perhaps, Leon Trotsky was killed while in 
exile in Mexico by a Stalinist agent wielding an ice axe). But drones enable states 
(and non-state actors) to deliver death from a safe distance, with a mechanical 
apparatus that is rarely seen, only heard, by those on the ground. One can 
imagine the possibilities. Drones are now designed the size of a small bird, like 
the sparrow-sized flying object that a Norwegian company in 2012 delivered to 
British forces in Afghanistan. These sparrows are used only for surveillance—as 
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yet. The bigger ones used by the United States carry rockets aptly named “Hellfire” 
and “The Grim Reaper.” 
Three states at present acknowledge that they carry out targeted killings by 
various means: Israel, Russia, and the United States. The Russian Parliament even 
passed a law in 2006 specifically permitting the President to authorize targeted 
killings against designated individuals abroad. In the United States, the debate 
inside and outside Congress was growing in 2013, with demands for oversight 
and transparency in the use of drones. The United States arguably possesses the 
most sophisticated means—in the form of the latest version of drones—and has 
certainly targeted the largest number of victims. Although the U.S. government 
provides no official data, the deaths are in the thousands. In Pakistan alone, CIA 
drone strikes killed over 2,000 persons in the period 2004–2012, and possibly 
closer to 4,000 (Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2012). U.S. drone strikes 
have also targeted and killed individuals in Yemen and Somalia, and in 2013 the 
Pentagon was establishing a drone base in Niger to carry out strikes in northwest 
Africa (Whitlock 2013). 
Importantly, unlike Afghanistan, these areas are outside what is customarily 
considered “zones of armed conflict.”6 Consequently, legal scholars and respected 
institutions—including several UN Special Rapporteurs, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), and Human Rights Watch—have claimed that these 
killings are clearly illegal, amounting to extra-judicial killings under international 
human rights law. Since 2002, all UN Special Rapporteurs on extra-judicial 
executions have condemned targeted killings outside strictly defined zones of 
armed conflict as illegal. The two most recent rapporteurs, Philip Alston and 
Christof Heyns, have been especially engaged. In 2012 the UN Special Rapporteur 
on counter-terrorism and human rights, Ben Emmerson, began actively pursuing 
the matter, threatening UN investigations of U.S. strikes. As these drone attacks 
are mostly executed by the CIA, the nomination of John Brennan as CIA director, 
in February 2013, generated significant public attention about the issue in the 
United States  (Finn and Blake 2013; U.S. Senate 2013). 
The case was laid out with great clarity in 2010 by the then UN Special 
Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions, Philip Alston (UN 2010). As Alston 
noted, one body of international law covers legitimate, but not arbitrary, killings 
in war zones (international humanitarian law), and a separate, though partly 
overlapping, corpus of law covers killing outside such zones (human rights 
law). Outside war zones (or what legal scholars prefer to call “zones of armed 
conflict”) taking life on purpose without judicial proceedings amounts to extra-
judicial executions and is illegal under international law. This does not include 
legitimately taking life in self-defence, or to spare another life (the so-called “law 
enforcement model”), where the immediate purpose is to protect, not to take, life. 
However, the targeted killings practiced by the United States and Israel outside 
generally recognized war zones have the immediate and explicit purpose of 
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taking life, as in an execution.   
The practice started under the Bush Administration, but the Obama 
Administration has been carrying out targeted killings of this kind at a 
quickening pace since 2008. The drawing up of a “kill-list” in the White House 
every Tuesday, as reported in 2012, perfectly expresses the purpose (Becker 
and Shane 2012). If the targets are in what under prevailing international legal 
standards would be considered a war zone, the actions could be legal, depending 
upon whether the target is a combatant or a civilian. In Afghanistan, the only 
clear case of “armed conflict” where the United States has been engaged during 
this period, the definition of “combatant” is extremely broad and not in line 
with prevailing legal interpretations: drug dealing if verified by two witnesses 
could land a person on the list (UN 2010). Outside war zones, as defined by a 
significant body of international legal experts (e.g., in Pakistan), targeted killings 
are of questionable legality, although the Obama Administration has plead self-
defence with reference to the 2001 attacks on the United States. Moreover, so-
called signature strikes have been used both inside and outside war zones to 
target categories of persons (e.g., men of military age) rather than an identified 
individual, raising serious concerns about obligations under international law to 
discriminate between civilians and combatants (ICRC 2009).
Growing pressure on the Obama Administration to bring practices in line 
with prevailing standards of international law appear to have had limited effect. 
In early 2012, the Administration drew up tighter guidelines for targets outside 
war zones. Reportedly, under these rules, the target would have to represent 
a “continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons,” and there had to be “near 
certainty” there would be no civilian (i.e., non-combatant) casualties (Baker 
2013). Equally important, President Obama announced, in a widely noted speech 
on May 23, 2013, that the “war on terror,” which had provided Washington with 
the justification for killing suspected terrorists wherever they were in the world, 
must come to an end (Obama 2013). He did not say, however, that this open-
ended, undeclared war had actually come to an end, and made clear that targeted 
killings with drones would continue. The guidelines drawn up in early 2012, 
and later signed by the President, have remained classified and there is no clear 
timetable as to when they would go into effect. By early 2014, there was only a 
plan to “transition to these standards and procedures over time.” The part of the 
plan that envisaged shifting drone operations from the CIA to the Pentagon, 
and thus increasing transparency, was on a particularly long time-schedule; the 
plan for this transitioning was to be reviewed every six months (Mazzetti 2014). 
Congressional critics and human rights activists have noted that little has changed 
in terms of oversight, accountability, and transparency. Public information 
about who has been targeted, when, where and why, and related casualties, has 
remained virtually nil.
The relevance of a human security perspective to address and modify these 
 Human Security 15 Years after Lysøen 195
practices is obvious, particularly in relation to protection of civilians. Despite 
the technological sophistication of drones, “collateral damage” appears to be 
significant (Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law 2012). The best public 
figures available for Pakistan, for instance, show that of the 2,300 persons killed 
by CIA drone strikes in the period 2004–2012, at least 464 were civilians (Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism 2012). This suggests a ratio of 1 in 5 victims as 
civilians (women, children, old men). It is questionable if this meets a reasonable 
interpretation of proportionality and discrimination under international 
humanitarian law. Moreover, the U.S. government has alternatively obfuscated 
and manipulated the legal basis for its targeted killings; drew a veil of secrecy 
around the procedures for determining lists of targets as well as assessments of 
how many, and who, were killed; refused to provide compensation to civilian, 
innocent victims; and refused to permit investigation and monitoring of the 
practice. The result has been “the displacement of clear legal standards with a 
vaguely defined licence to kill and the creation of a major accountability vacuum,” 
as Philip Alston put it (UN 2010, 1). What is at stake, then—beyond the lives lost 
and property damaged—is the rule of law. Alston’s successor, Christof Heyns, 
hardly exaggerated when he claimed that drone strikes threaten the very fabric of 
international law that has been developed through such effort since World War II 
(Bowcott 2012).
Rule of law is foundational for human security. Given the probability 
that a number of other states and non-state actors are likely to acquire drone 
technology and may well want to use it in the not-so-distant future, developing 
an international, law-based regime for regulating the use of drones is urgent. 
A proliferation of self-issued licences to kill by states or militant movements 
operating throughout the world is truly a frightening prospect.
Conclusion
This dismal prospect presents an opportunity to make the concept of human 
security relevant to genuine and immediate security needs in the early 21st 
century. The UN has developed impressive regulatory regimes to address 
several categories of vulnerable people, including refugees, displaced persons, 
child soldiers, and, more generally, civilians in situations of armed conflict. 
Developing a law-based regime with accountability provisions for targeted 
killings, particularly with drones, is a logical next item on the list. By early 2014, 
some work in this direction was underway within the UN system. Invoking 




1. Canada’s other two themes were strengthening peacekeeping and making the work of 
the Security Council more transparent.
2. Norway campaigned on three issues: (1) strengthen UN’s capacity to prevent and 
resolve conflicts, (2) strengthen coordination of UN agencies dealing with conflict 
management, and (3) create more transparency and better consultation between the 
Security Council and the other UN units.
3. Paul Heinbecker, Canadian UN ambassador 1999–2000, in communication to the 
author, February 17, 2013.
4. For example, see http://www.securitycouncilreport.or g/monthly-forecast/2013-02/
protection_of_civilians.php (accessed March 15, 2013).
5. See the website of Human Security Report Project: http://www.hsrgroup.org.
6. In 2005, the International Law Association asked, in its Committee on the Use of 
Force, to examine the meaning of war or armed conflict in international law. This step 
was provoked by the U.S. claim of the right to exercise belligerent privileges under law 
to conduct strikes against suspected terrorists in countries with which, or in which, the 
United States was not at war. Five years later the Committee delivered its report. It found 
that in law (as also in political science) the criteria for armed conflict (or war) were a 
degree of (1) organization and (2) intensity over time. Isolated incidents did not constitute 
armed conflict or war (International Law Association 2010).
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